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THE COLOR OF ALGORITHMS:  
AN ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED RESEARCH 
AGENDA FOR DETERRING ALGORITHMIC 
REDLINING 
 
James A. Allen* 
ABSTRACT 
Modern algorithms are capable of processing gargantuan amounts 
of data — with them, decision-making is faster and more efficient 
than ever.  This massive amount of data, termed “big data,” is 
compiled from innumerable sources, and due to decades of 
discrimination, often leads algorithms to arrive at biased results that 
disadvantage people of color and people from low- and moderate-
income communities.  Moreover, the decision-making procedures of 
modern algorithms are often structured by a homogenous group of 
people, who develop algorithms without transparency, auditing, or 
oversight. 
This lack of accountability is particularly worrisome because 
algorithms are beginning to be deployed more rapidly and more 
expansively by public and private actors.  Recent scholarship has 
raised concerns about how algorithms work to perpetuate 
discrimination and stereotypes in practically all areas, from casually 
searching the internet to criminal justice.  This Article explores how 
algorithms in the housing arena operate, or have the potential to 
operate, in a manner that perpetuates previous eras of discrimination 
and segregation.  By specifically concentrating on algorithms used in 
housing finance, marketing, and tenancy selection, this Article 
 
* J.D., Brooklyn Law School; B.A., Howard University.  I am indebted to Professor 
Christina Mulligan, for without her direction, this Article would not have been 
possible.  Special thanks to Nadav Pearl and the staff of the Fordham Urban Law 
Journal for excellent editing assistance and finding a home for this piece.  I am also 
grateful for the helpful comments of Sara Amri, Christopher Wallace, and Thebe 
Kgositsile.  Finally, thanks are owed to Richard Rothstein, author of The Color of 
Law, which was the inspiration for this Article. 
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provides a research agenda for exploring whether housing 
stakeholders are creating an era of algorithmic redlining. 
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After the lecture, when the judge said, “I’m going to give you boys 
another chance,” I don’t know why or what happened, but I heard 
myself say, “Man, you not givin’ us another chance.  You givin’ us 
the same chance we had before.” 
- Claude Brown, MANCHILD IN THE PROMISED LAND1 
Harlem, New York 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Algorithms, or automated decision systems, are being used by 
public and private entities to optimize efficiency, cut costs, and 
expand social welfare.2  Although beneficial in many respects, 
algorithms deployed by public and private actors also make decisions 
that go against our better instinct.3  Algorithms are now being used in 
the affordable and fair housing arena — to ensure equitable results, 
these algorithms must be implemented with transparency, auditing, 
and oversight.4  This Article explores the potentially inequitable uses 
of big data and algorithms in the housing arena and suggests how 
different actors in the United States may be perpetuating a previous 
era of “redlining.” 
In its most technical sense, the term “redlining” can be traced back 
to the 1933 practice of racial discrimination stewarded by the United 
States government’s Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC).5  At 
 
 1. CLAUDE BROWN, MANCHILD IN THE PROMISED LAND 118 (1965). 
 2. See, e.g., VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A 
REVOLUTION THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 52–61 
(2013); Kevin Slavin, HOW ALGORITHMS SHAPE OUR WORLD (TEDGLOBAL 2011), 
https://www.ted.com/talks/kevin_slavin_how_algorithms_shape_our_world 
[https://perma.cc/R9ZY-Y2WY]; THE SECRET RULES OF MODERN LIVING: 
ALGORITHMS (BBC Four 2015) (detailing algorithms built by private entities and 
deployed by the aviation administrators to assist in coordinating plane arrival and 
departure; detailing a matching algorithm created by academics to connect those in 
need of organs with organ donors). 
 3. See, e.g., VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH 
TOOLS PROFILE, POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR 1–13 (2017); SAFIYA UMOJA NOBLE, 
ALGORITHMS OF OPPRESSION: HOW SEARCH ENGINES REINFORCE RACISM 12–14 
(2018); CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION 1–13 (2016). 
 4. Nestor M. Davidson, Affordable Housing Law and Policy in an Era of Big 
Data, 44 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 277, 278 (2017) (discussing how data is used to focus on 
outputs, such as the number of units that can be constructed from a given investment 
or management property jobs, but should instead focus on outcomes, “the actual 
short- and long-term consequences of policy interventions for those served by 
affordable housing programs and the communities at issue”). 
 5. See generally RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN 
HISTORY OF HOW OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA viii (2017) (describing 
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the time, the HOLC was the nation’s largest financer of federally-
backed government loans, lending to individuals and families to buy 
homes.6  However, the HOLC did not disburse these government-
backed loans equitably — the agency would literally draw red lines on 
maps around communities of color, which they identified as too risky 
to serve.7  This practice etymologized what became widely known as 
“redlining,” as underwriters across the country followed suit in an 
attempt to adhere to the federal government’s “risk-evaluation” 
standards.8 
As the practice of redlining expanded, so did its meaning.  The 
term “redlining” has since become more encompassing and is now 
commonly considered to describe the general practice of an 
institution’s refusal to provide resources and financial support to 
areas considered “high-risk.”9  Unfortunately, these “high-risk” areas 
remain disproportionately those with properties owned by people of 
color, due in large part to the previous era of technical redlining.10  
Though the housing industry has moved away from maps and red 
pencils, “redlining” and its historical impact remain relevant today.  
This Article cautions that overreliance on automated, algorithmic 
decision-making systems may perpetuate housing segregation through 
“algorithmic redlining.”  In line with the modern, broader 
understanding of redlining, this Article uses the term “algorithmic 
redlining” to encompass sets of instructions — simple or complex — 
which carry out procedures that prohibit or limit people of color from 
 
how racial segregation became de jure policy of the federal government in the 
context of housing). 
 6. Id. at 63–67. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 65–67 (describing how the Federal Housing Administration’s 
Underwriter’s Manual required racially segregating procedures). 
 9. Redlining, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see also OFFICE OF THE 
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT FACT SHEET n.1 
(2014), https://www.occ.gov/topics/community-affairs/publications/fact-sheets/pub-
fact-sheet-cra-reinvestment-act-mar-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/9H8D-D4UY] 
(“‘Redlining’ refers to the practice whereby lending institutions refused to offer 
home loans in certain neighborhoods, based on the income, racial or ethnic 
composition of the area.  The term ‘redlining’ stems from some lenders’ practice of 
using a red pencil to outline such areas.”); Barbara A. Kleinman & Katherine Sloss 
Berger, The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975: Will It Protect Urban 
Consumers from Redlining, 12 NEW ENG. L. REV. 957, 957 (1977). 
 10. Redlining, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 9.  Unfortunately, this 
Article addresses redlining only as a backdrop to how it has informed and created the 
data that impacts modern algorithms.  For a persuasive, detailed background on 
redlining’s perverse impact, see Richard Rothstein’s The Color of Law: A Forgotten 
History of How Our Government Segregate America is a tour de force. See generally 
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 5. 
2019] FORDHAM URB. L.J. 223 
procuring housing or housing financing, particularly in non-minority 
neighborhoods.11  Algorithmic redlining and the original era of pencil 
redlining are synchronized in a crucial way: both result in the 
exclusion of minority and low-income members of society from access 
to adequate housing.12 
This Article explores the impact and potential harms of 
overreliance on automated decision systems, specifically in the 
housing equity context, and proceeds in three parts.  Part I provides a 
brief history of algorithms, from their origins as a basic set of steps to 
complex, autonomous procedures.  This includes a discussion of the 
rise of “big data” and an exploration of how machine learning has 
intensified the proliferation of automated decision systems.  Part I 
also addresses some of the recent concerns about algorithms as 
expressed by community activists, academics, and lawmakers — as 
algorithms become more expansive, so too have concerns about their 
adverse impact on society.  A discussion of this history is important in 
understanding how pencil redlining was, in a way, an algorithm: 
“area” plus “colored people” equals “do not lend.”  It is also 
important to appreciate how redlining resulted in adverse 
consequences for people of color, consequences that make up the 
data modern algorithms use to generate decisions. 
Part II begins with a brief discussion of the importance of access to 
housing equity, and then offers a research agenda to explore how 
algorithmic redlining has the potential to exacerbate existing 
segregation.  This Part examines the use of algorithms in three 
particular areas of the housing market and explores the segregation 
that can result when algorithms themselves are discriminatory.  The 
first, and perhaps most important, area is that of housing finance — 
because of biases built into automated credit evaluation and mortgage 
lending decisions, algorithms act as initial barriers for a subset of 
people attempting to access credit and housing finance.13  This initial 
barrier to financing comes in the form of scoring systems that rate the 
riskiness of credit and mortgage applicants, as well as algorithms used 
 
 11. “Algorithmic redlining” is left intentionally broad and generally means any 
computational process that operates to curtail a person or family’s access to housing 
based on race and/or socioeconomic status. 
 12. See infra Part II. 
 13. See, e.g., Aaron Glantz & Emannuel Martinez, Kept Out: For People of 
Color, Banks Are Shutting the Door to Homeownership, REVEAL (Feb. 15, 2018), 
https://www.revealnews.org/article/for-people-of-color-banks-are-shutting-the-door-
to-homeownership/ [https://perma.cc/L4M9-SMN5]. 
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to target minorities and low-income individuals for usurious loans.14  
By reviewing initial reports of systems that rely on these kinds of 
algorithms, it is possible to see that they result in disproportionately 
negative lending practices towards people of color.15  The second area 
of potential biases is found in the algorithms that direct advertising or 
marketing towards different races.  While present research 
concerning online advertising in the housing ownership and rental 
market is scant, bias in other areas of online discriminatory marketing 
is reason for concern.16  Finally, the third area of potential bias is in 
unfair algorithms that may be used in the housing selection process.  
This is exhibited by recent calls of housing advocates for reform in 
offline affordable housing lottery algorithms17 and in the algorithms 
used to evaluate private market rental applicants.18 
Part III reviews previous reforms and discusses how these once 
beneficial policies are outdated in the modern, online housing 
economy.  This Part borrows from previous policies to suggest various 
ways in which the adverse impacts of algorithmic redlining can be 
curbed: transparency, oversight, and greater human autonomy in 
automated decision-making.  These suggestions draw on previous 
legislation in the United States and contemporary legislation in the 
European Union, while also advocating for reforms previously put 
forth by academics and stakeholders, who call for a modernization of 
laws impacting the areas mentioned above.  While some of these 
reforms may seem improbable, particularly given America’s political 
climate, this Part discusses why these laws are really commonsense 
and necessary to protect the modern consumer. 
 
 14. Linda E. Fisher, Target Marketing of Subprime Loans: Racialized Consumer 
Fraud & Reverse Redlining, 18 J.L. & POL’Y 121, 124 (2009); Andrea Freeman, 
Racism in the Credit Card Industry, 95 N.C. L. REV. 1071, 1078 (2017). 
 15. Cassandra Jones Havard, “On the Take”: The Black Box of Credit Scoring 
and Mortgage Discrimination, 20 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 241, 241 (2011). 
 16. O’NEIL, supra note 3, at 68–83 (describing predatory and biased online 
marketing). 
 17. Ethan Geringer-Sameth, ‘Community Preference’ Lawsuit at Center of 
Affordable Housing, Segregation Debates, GOTHAM GAZETTE (Mar. 29, 2017), 
http://www.gothamgazette.com/city/6838-community-preference-lawsuit-at-center-of-
affordable-housing-segregation-debates [https://perma.cc/4N4A-HGAE]; Keaton 
Norquist, Local Preferences in Affordable Housing: Special Treatment for Those 
Who Live or Work in a Municipality, 36 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 207, 207 (2009). 
 18. Eric Dunn & Merf Ehman, Rental Housing’s Elephant in the Room — The 
Probable Disparate Impact of Unlawful Detainer Records, 65 WASH. ST. B. NEWS 35, 
40 (2011). 
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I.  “THIS IS THE PROCEDURE”: A BRIEF HISTORY OF ALGORITHMS, 
FROM BYZANTINE TO BOOLEAN 
In their simplest form, “algorithms” are processes that rely on a 
specific set of steps to consistently produce the same result.19  When 
an entity with knowledge of how a given procedure functions conveys 
this information in a step-by-step formulation, it can reproduce the 
steps or particular method of analysis for the given criteria as an 
algorithm.20  Once conveyed in this way, anyone can apply data to the 
algorithm, and the results remain predictable.21 
In a sense, algorithms have always been an engine that drives 
societal advancement.  Some of the earliest algorithms were used to 
advance community and economic development by conveying how to 
build infrastructure or how to determine the rate of carried interest 
on a potential investment.22  For example, early societies used 
algorithmic methods to manage the crucial practice of water 
management: if a person knew the length, width, and height of a 
certain area, with the appropriate algorithm, that person could use 
that data to build a cistern.23  If a person knew they had capital 
commitments from potential investors for their cistern-building 
business, with the appropriate algorithm, they could take the 
investor’s pledged commitments and calculate their potential carried 
interest.24  These basic examples are not too different from those used 
in recent history or even today. 
While ancient algorithms are similar in their objective to today’s 
algorithms, the latter are obviously far more complex.25  Modern 
 
 19. Algorithm, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “algorithm” 
as “[a] mathematical or logical process consisting of a series of steps, designed to 
solve a specific type of problem”); see also DAVID BERLINKSKI, THE ADVENT OF THE 
ALGORITHM: THE IDEA THAT RULES THE WORLD xvi (2000). 
 20. See, e.g., THE SECRET RULES OF MODERN LIVING: ALGORITHMS, supra note 2. 
 21. See DONALD E. KNUTH, SELECTED PAPERS ON COMPUTER SCIENCE 191–94 
(1996). 
 22. See id. (describing the ancient Babylonian practice of using algorithms to 
convey methods of building infrastructure and calculating carried interest and rates 
of usury).  These ancient algorithms frequently concluded with the same post-amble: 
“This is the procedure.”  Knuth points out that the common use of the phrase, “This 
is the procedure,” is proof that these were algorithms — a way of denoting a 
particular process meant to produce the same result at a time when algorithms were 
yet to be defined. See id. at 188. 
 23. Id. at 187. 
 24. Id. 
 25. M.D. Atkinson, The Complexity of Algorithms, in COMPUTING TOMORROW 1 
(Ian Wand & Robin Miller eds., 1996); John F. McGowan, Complex Algorithm 
Research and Development: Harder Than Many Think, MATHBLOG.COM (July 20, 
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algorithms are tremendously intricate and take many forms.  Most 
relevant to the discussion here are “machine learning” algorithms,26 
which are informed and powered by “big data.”27  In a broad sense, 
big data is the process of aggregating massive amounts of information 
from various online platforms and data capturing entities for the 
purpose of identifying potential patterns; machine learning algorithms 
are a form of artificial intelligence, which operate to process big data, 
learn from it, and then perform tasks and analytics.28  These are such 
well-known terms that they have become buzzwords, as popular as 
they are opaque and complicated.29 
In essence, increasingly invasive modern algorithms — deployed by 
private businesses and governmental actors alike — use sophisticated 
computer technology and aggregated sets of data to generate 
automated decisions and assumptions about individuals.30  By 
 
2009), https://mathblog.com/complex-algorithm-research-and-development-harder-
than-many-think/ [https://perma.cc/GA5R-EMGB] (discussing the complexity of 
modern algorithms). 
 26. Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 638 
(2017) (describing machine learning systems as those “that derive their decision rules 
from data rather than from code written by a programmer”). 
 27. See Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a 
Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 96 (2014); see 
also Jack M. Balkin, 2016 Sidley Austin Distinguished Lecture on Big Data Law and 
Policy: The Three Laws of Robotics in the Age of Big Data, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 1217, 
1219–20 (2017) (“Big Data, too, is just a feature of the Algorithmic Society.  In fact, 
Big Data is just the flip side of a society organized around algorithmic decision-
making.  Big Data is the fuel that runs the Algorithmic Society; it is also the product 
of its operations.  Collection and processing of data produces ever more data, which 
in turn, can be to improve the performance of algorithms.  To vary Kant’s famous 
dictum, algorithms without data are empty; data without algorithms are blind.”). 
 28. For further reading concerning big data, see The Big Data Conundrum: How 
to Define It?, MIT TECH. REV. (Oct. 3, 2013), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/519851/the-big-data-conundrum-how-to-define-
it/ [https://perma.cc/828Q-QDC7].  For further reading concerning machine learning 
algorithms, see Nikki Castle, An Introduction to Machine Learning Algorithms, 
DATASCIENCE (June 29, 2017), https://www.datascience.com/blog/introduction-to-
machine-learning-algorithms [https://perma.cc/N7N3-2SB3]. 
 29. Jackie Snow, An A.I. Glossary, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/18/business/an-ai-glossary.html 
[https://nyti.ms/2AgdiSh] (discussing and explaining many of these buzzwords). 
 30. Maurice E. Stucke & Ariel Ezrachi, Looking Up in the Data-Driven 
Economy, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., May 2017, at 5, 
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/CPI-
Stucke-Ezrachi.pdf [https://perma.cc/RA56-GLWL] (quoting Tim Berners-Lee, a 
founder of the World Wide Web, who distinctively points out that “[t]hese sites make 
more money when we click on the links they show us.  And, they choose what to 
show us based on algorithms which learn from our personal data that they are 
constantly harvesting.”). 
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gathering personally identifiable information and optimizing data 
aggregating techniques, big data is able to reform and refine 
algorithms, making them more efficient and producing more 
“rational” decisions.31  Modern machine learning algorithms are now 
being used for everyday purposes, making automated decisions about 
matters concerning everything from leisure to subsistence.  For 
example, Netflix uses a machine learning algorithm to suggest what 
shows a viewer may wish to add to their queue,32 and New York City 
wants to use an algorithm to automatically enroll individuals in 
welfare benefits.33 
Though efficient and socially productive, the race to create and 
deploy algorithms may come at a cost.34  For one, it is possible that 
enhancing efficiency through algorithms is coupled with overt 
invasions of privacy.35  One popular example of such privacy invasion 
took place in 2012, when a Target algorithm inadvertently served as 
one woman’s publicized pregnancy announcement.36  Target became 
the subject of public scorn when one of its automated decision-
 
 31. MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 2, at 52–61. 
 32. Tom Vanderbilt, The Science Behind the Netflix Algorithms that Decide 
What You’ll Be Watching Next, WIRED (Aug. 7, 2013), 
https://www.wired.com/2013/08/qq_netflix-algorithm/ [https://perma.cc/2TFJ-MBDA] 
(describing the algorithms that suggest movies and shows on Netflix). 
 33. NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., Int. 0855-B (2018) (a bill to use computer algorithms 
to auto-enroll New York City residents into eligible benefits plans). 
 34. Donald Knuth — considered the father of the modern algorithm and the 
“Yoda of Silicon Valley” — has warned that “premature optimization is the root of 
all evil,” and in discussing modern algorithms, said that he is “worried that algorithms 
are getting too prominent in the world.” Siobhan Roberts, The Yoda of Silicon 
Valley, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/17/science/donald-knuth-computers-algorithms-
programming.html [https://nyti.ms/2GjaIjp]. See also Davidson, supra note 4, at 279 
(describing how data-driven policy, in examining outputs, is creating a “positive 
feedback loop”); Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Taming the Golem: Challenges of 
Ethical Algorithmic Decision-Making, 19 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 125, 134–35 (2017) 
(summarizing the debate regarding “faulty algorithms”). 
 35. FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS 
THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 3 (2015) (“Surveillance cameras, data 
brokers, sensor networks, and ‘supercookies’ record how fast we drive, what pills we 
take, what books we read, what websites we visit.  The law, so aggressively protective 
of secrecy in the world of commerce, is increasingly silent when it comes to the 
privacy of persons.”); Daniel J. Steinbock, Data Matching, Data Mining, and Due 
Process, 40 GA. L. REV. 1, 6 (2005). 
 36. Kashmir Hill, How Target Figured Out a Teen Girl Was Pregnant Before Her 
Father Did, FORBES (Feb. 16, 2012), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2012/02/16/how-target-figured-out-a-teen-
girl-was-pregnant-before-her-father-did/#6a9c5c3c6668 [https://perma.cc/S8TL-
5TDD]. 
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making algorithms, which utilizes big data, concluded that a customer 
was pregnant.37  The company sent her family promotional 
advertisements for pregnancy and baby products — before her father 
was aware that she was expecting.38 
Additionally, the lack of transparency in how various public or 
private actors utilize algorithms has been a major cause for concern 
among academics, legal advocates, and lawmakers.39  Transparency 
issues are often bifurcated into two conceptually different types of 
algorithms.  First are “source code algorithms”; developed by private 
entities and often deployed by public agencies, these algorithms are 
immune from disclosure because their code is protected under the 
harbors of trade secret laws.40  Second are complex “machine-
learning algorithms” or “neural-network algorithms,” which, while 
also enjoying trade secret protection, are opaque in a different sense; 
these algorithms are fed data and then arrive at decisions 
autonomously, making transparency difficult even if mandatory 
disclosure were required.41 
In addition to being criticized for their invasiveness and opacity, 
algorithms are criticized for being racially biased.42  These criticisms 
 
 37. Id.  Target’s marketers identified potentially pregnant women by mining 
buying patterns like cocoa butter, calcium tablets, and larger purses that could hold 
diapers. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See Decision & Judgment at 1–5, Brennan Ctr. for Justice at N.Y.U. Law Sch. 
v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, No. 160541/2016, 2017 WL 6610414 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 27, 
2017) (finding that the New York Police Department had to produce documents 
about its predictive policing algorithms to the Brennan Center at New York 
University School of Law under a Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) request); see 
also Cliff Kuang, Can A.I. Be Taught to Explain Itself?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Nov. 21, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/21/magazine/can-ai-be-taught-to-explain-
itself.html [https://nyti.ms/2hR2weQ]. 
 40. See generally PASQUALE, supra note 35, at 1–18; see also Danielle Keats 
Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 1292–93 (2008) 
(describing how Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) regulations exempt trade 
secrets). 
 41. David Grossman, How Machine Learning Robots Teach Themselves, 
POPULAR MECHANICS (Dec. 19, 2017), 
https://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/robots/a14457503/how-machine-
learning-lets-robots-teach-themselves/ [https://perma.cc/ETR5-AFPS]; Kroll et al., 
supra note 26, at 638 (reflecting on the difficulty of regulating machine learning 
algorithms and the decisions they produce). 
 42. See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING 
OPPORTUNITIES, PRESERVING VALUES 7–8 (May 2014), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/big_data_privacy_repor
t_may_1_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/7TEB-UCXJ] [hereinafter BIG DATA: SEIZING 
OPPORTUNITIES]; Megan L. Brown et al., ACLU Suit Attacks Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act to Investigate Website Discrimination Using Controversial Online 
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are largely advanced under two theories — that modern algorithms 
are built using decades of discriminatory data, and that they are 
created by a homogenous fraction of persons with inherent biases.43  
Ample research has shown that by using biased data and potentially 
biased code, algorithms are creating a funneling effect that 
perpetuates discrimination and stereotypes.44  Understanding the 
importance of bias in algorithms is crucial as we shift to what internet 
law scholars have dubbed the “scored society” — a culture driven by 
evaluating people based on shadowy metrics and ratings.45  
Complainants have recently started alleging that biased algorithms 
are generating biased scores, which are then used to influence or 
make decisions in a range of important matters such as criminal 
justice, distribution of social services, evaluation of public employees, 
and even influencing democratic elections.46  Like so many of these 
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 43. Bryce W. Goodman, Economic Models of (Algorithmic) Discrimination 1–2 
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TIMES (June 25, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/26/opinion/sunday/artificial-
intelligences-white-guy-problem.html [https://nyti.ms/28YaKg7] (describing how 
coders building algorithms are often white males). 
 44. Davidson, supra note 4, at 279–80; Madden et al., supra note 43, at 64–67; 
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Stereotypes, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 20, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/10/new-evidence-
shows-search-engines-reinforce-social-stereotypes [https://perma.cc/8NQQ-SMQW]. 
 45. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 43, at 4. 
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BlackburnM-20180426.pdf [https://perma.cc/4HNC-CKPT] (statement of Chairman 
Rep. Marsha Blackburn); Amanda Taub & Max Fisher, Where Countries Are 
Tinderboxes and Facebook Is a Match, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2018), 
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other areas, automated decisions in the housing arena are not 
immune to the biases found in big data processing.47 
As we begin to rely more frequently on algorithms to make 
decisions in sensitive areas of public policy, including the increasingly 
important area of housing, it is important that those algorithms are 
not only efficient and accurate, but also equitable.48  Beginning with a 
brief overview of the importance of housing and homeownership, the 
next Part of this Article suggests a research agenda focusing on how 
cryptic algorithms may be used at various levels in housing 
procurement to perpetuate deep physical segregation within society 
— this is algorithmic redlining. 
II.  ALGORITHMIC REDLINING: THE THREAT OF 
AUTOGENERATING SEGREGATION 
Housing and homeownership are important to the American public 
for several reasons.49  For one, owning a home is considered a reliable 
asset, and home equity is often cited as an important factor in helping 
families enter the middle class.50  Additionally, housing and 
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and cause public unrest); see, e.g., Pitch v. Lightbourne, 221 Cal. App. 4th 480, 484 
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allegedly produced erroneous benefit terminations); Hous. Fed’n of Teachers v. 
Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1171 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (teachers 
alleging they were inappropriately fired due to an algorithm that evaluated 
performance). 
 47. See Davidson, supra note 4, at 279–80; Lee Anne Fennell, Searching for Fair 
Housing, 97 B.U. L. REV. 349, 361 (2017). 
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analytics have the potential to eclipse longstanding civil rights protections in how 
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their opportunities and potential.”). 
 49. William M. Rohe & Mark Lindblad, Reexamining the Social Benefits of 
Homeownership After the Housing Crisis, JOINT CTR. FOR HOUSING STUD., HARV. 
UNIV. 6–9 (Aug. 2013), http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/hbtl-04.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3KTR-LZ5D]; Beneficial Impacts of Homeownership: A Research 
Summary, HABITAT FOR HUMANITY 1 (2016), http://www.habitatbuilds.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/04/Benefits-of-Homeownership-Research-Summary.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZL3U-7ATK]; Michelle Higgins, Homeownership, the Key to 
Happiness?, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2013), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/realestate/homeownership-the-key-to-
happiness.html [https://nyti.ms/1dr7q3j]. 
 50. Pamela M. Blumenthal & John R. McGinty, Housing Policy Levers to 
Promote Economic Mobility, URB. INST. 2015, at 5, 
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homeownership determine where one lives, which often correlates 
with a host of other factors such as where one goes to school (thus 
significantly impacting on the quality of one’s education51), the 
quality of health, and overall quality of life.52  Nevertheless, both 
owning and renting property can be prohibitively expensive.53  This 
creates a problematic dichotomy: affordable housing and 
homeownership are simultaneously vital and out of reach for most 
Americans.54  Recognizing this, lawmakers have attempted to 
facilitate greater homeownership in the United States by introducing 
policies that make home financing, home marketing, and affordable 
housing procurement accessible to a larger portion of the American 
public.55  Though commendable in theory, many of these policies 
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Neighborhoods Left Out of City’s Elite Schools, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 3, 2018), 
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students from the poorest schools in New York rarely make it into the City’s elite 
schools). 
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 54. Dickerson, supra note 53, at 189. 
 55. See Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2801 (2012); Community 
Reinvestment Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (2012); Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. 
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have had a deleterious impact, directly segregating neighborhoods in 
two ways: by making the benefits of these policies available to only a 
select few, and by concentrating investments and the infrastructure of 
these policies according to demographic.56 
Consider, for example, the Fair Housing Act (FHA), which was 
established with the goal of promoting homeownership for a greater, 
more diverse group of people.57  The FHA undoubtedly identified an 
important hurdle for minorities attempting to access housing,58 but 
scholars have argued that by not accounting for the impact that prior 
racial discrimination and segregation had on income inequality, the 
FHA did not go far enough in expanding housing access for 
minorities, thus benefiting only the select few who were lucky enough 
to accumulate wealth during the era of pencil redlining.59 
Moreover, as Caucasian-American families migrated to the 
suburbs — often after accumulating wealth from home equity 
unavailable to minorities during the era of pencil redlining — public 
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Room for Improvement, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Apr. 18, 2018), 
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and private investment migrated with them.60  Public infrastructure 
projects, including the development of residential subdivisions that 
often enacted racially-restrictive covenants, were concentrated in 
predominantly Caucasian-American neighborhoods.61  Additionally, 
private lenders, though legally prohibited from discriminating based 
on race in credit evaluations, still used race as a factor for mortgage 
applicants.  For example, consider the Equal Credit Opportunity Act 
(ECOA) — legislation enacted following the era of pencil redlining 
that fostered a series of regulations designed to curb racial 
discrimination in lending.62 One of those regulations, 12 C.F.R. § 
1002.6,63 specifically prohibits lenders from using race as a metric in 
evaluating credit applicants, yet section 1002.13, titled “Information 
for monitoring purposes,” specifically requires mortgage lenders to 
account for race: 
(a) Information to be requested.  (1) A creditor that receives an 
application for credit primarily for the purchase or refinancing of a 
dwelling . . . shall request as part of the application the following 
information regarding the applicant(s): (i) Ethnicity, using the 
categories Hispanic or Latino, and not Hispanic or Latino; and for 
race, the aggregate categories American Indian or Alaska Native, 
Asian, Black or African American, Native Hawaiian or Other 
Pacific Islander, and White . . . .64 
Consequently, over the last several decades, segregating housing 
policies, particularly those that deal with housing finance, have 
greatly tilted the playing field by systematically disenfranchising 
communities of color.65  Racially isolating housing policies have also 
exacerbated segregation according to socioeconomic status, forcing 
low-income families and individuals into inadequate living conditions 
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such as slums, areas with poorly performing schools, deteriorating 
recreational facilities, and underfunded hospitals.66 
The segregating policies discussed, one of which was pencil 
redlining, have greatly influenced modern algorithms because they 
generated massive data sets that consist of decades of information 
built on exclusion and discrimination.  When modern algorithms rely 
on these databases to make automated decisions, they engage in 
algorithmic redlining — reproducing, reinforcing, and perpetuating 
preexisting segregation.67  The coming subsections examine precisely 
these algorithms, which make determinations in housing finance, 
marketing, and housing selection.  This Article describes how these 
automated decision-making systems operate and explains their 
potential to operate in today’s scored society in a manner that 
furthers segregation. 
First is an overview of perhaps the most important form of 
algorithmic redlining: algorithms operating in the sphere of housing 
finance.68  Algorithms that determine an applicant’s creditworthiness 
are of utmost importance, as they serve as a functional gatekeeper to 
the funds necessary to procure housing.  Second is a discussion of 
algorithms used in online housing marketing.69  As mentioned, with 
the increased use of internet advertising to find housing, it is 
important that the algorithms that act as editors of what options 
consumers view are not corrupted by biased search characteristics.70  
Finally, there is a subsection analyzing housing selection algorithms, 
which can act as barriers to available housing and are a key part of 
anyone’s access to affordable and inclusive housing.71  Unfortunately, 
many algorithms that assess and determine housing procurement are 
tainted by biased data and segregating weighting techniques.72  These 
three issues — finance, marketing, and selection — are not meant to 
be an exhaustive list of the forms of algorithmic redlining that may 
perpetuate segregation.  Rather, this Article aims to show that 
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 67. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 68. See infra Section II.A. 
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 71. See infra Section II.B. 
 72. See infra Sections II.A and II.B. 
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research into, and monitoring of, each is critical to fostering truly 
integrated communities across America.73 
A. Potential Harms of Discriminatory Credit and Lending 
Algorithms 
Banks have relied on “consumer data” to determine an applicant’s 
creditworthiness as a guise to discriminate based on race for 
decades.74  As previously mentioned, the United States pioneered the 
practice of race-based credit evaluations as early as 1933, when the 
federal government’s HOLC would draw red lines around African-
American neighborhoods and communities of color that were 
identified as “too-risky to serve.”75  The government’s overtly racist 
practice of redlining became commonplace in America, as 
underwriters across the country drew lines on their maps to follow the 
U.S. government’s “risk-evaluation” standards.76 
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focuses on a particularly salient subset of these kinds of algorithms. 
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Redlined neighborhoods were usually urban areas housing people 
of color.77  In these neighborhoods, financially qualified community 
members were denied consideration for credit or mortgages because 
of their skin color, or even because they lived near a person of 
color.78  Construed as an objective model to determine efficient 
lending, the U.S. Federal Housing Administration openly used 
redlined maps to inform computational evaluation algorithms for 
risk-rating calculations, racist cartography, and discriminatory tax 
appraisals.79  Building upon these discriminatory evaluations, 
government funded public works and institutional investors were 
encouraged to direct their investments in white areas and disinvest 
from black communities.80  Eventually, these race-based investment 
decisions became self-actualizing: by making it nearly impossible for 
black communities to obtain access to equitable housing finance, 
people and neighborhoods of color were forced into adverse financial 
circumstances and adverse living conditions.81 
Today, the consequences of the era of redlining have stained the 
“big data” that determines conditions for housing financing.  For 
example, scholars have recently made persuasive arguments that 
there have been racist practices in the credit reporting industry, which 
produces metrics that evaluate a person’s ever-important credit 
score.82  Similarly, academics have raised concerns that race-based 
evaluations play a role in determining mortgage rates for borrowers-
of-color, an industry that heavily relies on credit scores.83  Algorithms 
making biased choices regarding housing are also exhibited in 
analyses of the Great Recession, which saw an era of “reverse 
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redlining” — a shorthand for the practice of targeting African 
Americans for the hyper-lending of subprime mortgages.84  Finally, 
consumer protection scholars and advocates have also alleged that 
algorithms have been used as a tool to predatorily target low-income 
people of color for the solicitation of highly usurious “payday loans,” 
adding to the barriers of financial hardship.85  Importantly, each of 
the abovementioned practices relies on algorithms to limit access to 
desperately needed housing financing for communities of color. 
1. Credit Card Scoring and Algorithms Giving Access to Loans 
A credit score is a metric that lenders use to evaluate a person’s 
creditworthiness — a determination of whether it is safe to grant a 
loan to an applicant because she can be trusted to fulfill the 
obligations of that loan.86  Traditionally, credit scores are compiled 
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using sets of data mainly pertaining to a person’s financial 
transactions.87  However, like many other modern algorithms, credit 
scoring algorithms are beginning to include data points that go 
beyond personal financial transactions.88  Using “big data,” credit 
scoring firms claim that they will be able to make more accurate 
assessments of creditworthiness.89  Unfortunately, like the redlined 
maps of the 1930s, many of the data points that algorithms use to 
generate credit scores have a disproportionately adverse impact on 
low-income communities of color, and, in some instances, even on 
those who patronize establishments in those communities.90  For 
example, American Express came under scorn when customers 
complained that, even though they had successfully made credit 
payments, their scores were tarnished for shopping at establishments 
where other patrons are considered less “creditworthy.”91 
Such biased miscalculations are particularly worrisome because 
many industries use credit scores to assess whether someone qualifies 
for crucial needs such as housing financing.  In the mortgage industry, 
lenders frequently rely on credit scores to determine whether to 
approve mortgages to home seekers, and to determine what rates of 
interest to charge when making loans.92  If credit scores are being 
generated using suspect, race-related data, such scoring operates to 
the disadvantage of communities of color by restricting access to 
equitable lending.  This is particularly true as computer algorithms 
begin to heavily rely on zip codes to score society, because zip codes 
are often tied to race and socioeconomic status.93 
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Without access to housing finance, communities of color are 
restricted to rental options, diminishing (if not eviscerating) their 
opportunity to build equity through homeownership.94  Even if 
biasedly-scored applicants are able to obtain mortgages, their interest 
rates will be higher — thus, they will likely be restricted to 
purchasable properties in low-value and low-income areas, which are 
often isolated from booming job markets and other desirable 
characteristics.95  Ironically, as evidenced by post-mortems of the 
Great Recession, lenders use modern algorithms as a tool to target 
people of color whom lenders had determined to be more susceptible 
to high-interest loans.  Thus, although credit scoring algorithms are a 
potentially biased barrier in accessing housing finance, other 
algorithms are used to target minority, disproportionately low-income 
applicants with financially burdensome loans.  The ways in which 
algorithms have been used to burden minorities through reverse 
redlining, subprime mortgages, and payday loans is discussed in 
further detail in the coming section. 
2. Algorithms Used in Reverse Redlining, Subprime Mortgages, 
and Payday Loans 
As academics and consumer advocates started to diagnose the 
causes of the Great Recession, many began to suggest that part of the 
problem was the emergence of “reverse redlining.”96  Reverse 
redlining is the practice of targeting minorities with home loans that 
have steep interest rates and complicated compliance provisions.97  
Irrespective of the biased metrics that generate poor creditworthiness 
ratings, in the leadup to the Great Recession, algorithms were used by 
lenders to target African Americans chasing the dream of 
homeownership; in reality, however, these lenders were burdening 
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them with nightmare loans.98  These minority individuals and families 
were often more willing to accept subprime loans because they were 
less familiar with lending practices and more desperate for housing 
finance, factors that are repercussions from the previous era of 
redlining and biased creditworthiness evaluations.99  Moreover, 
because of the extremely high premiums attached to these loans, 
chances of default were more likely — defaults led to foreclosure, 
foreclosures led to evictions and vacancies, which created slums 
riddled with poverty, crime, and a general worsening of the quality of 
life.100  Worryingly, these predatory lending practices have not ceased 
since the Great Recession.101  Rather, they have taken new form in 
algorithms used to target vulnerable populations through the 
solicitation of highly usurious “payday loans.”102 
Like subprime mortgages, payday loans are usually targeted at low-
income, less educated American populations, who are often unable to 
understand the complicated interest rates and hidden fees attached to 
payday loans.103  In a sense, the disproportionate disbursement of 
payday loans to low-income communities of color is the premier 
example of the ills of redlining, both pencil and algorithmic.  Like 
subprime mortgages, targeted communities accept payday loans 
because of the desperation for financing, as indicated by the 
exorbitantly high interest rates they are willing to accept — this 
desperation is a product of pencil redlining, when no financing 
whatsoever was available.104  Algorithms only exacerbate this 
problem because they target and market payday loans specifically to 
low-income communities of color, learning from preexisting data that 
residents in those communities will be more willing to subscribe to 
their usurious disbursements.105  Unfortunately, because these 
communities are often underfunded and neglected, schools tend to 
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perform poorly, leading to a less educated populous that is often less 
likely to be aware of a payday loan’s usurious impact.106 
In sum, when the lending industry relies on automated, algorithmic 
decision-making systems, it also relies on biased technologies that 
disproportionately target and score minority individuals and their 
families more negatively.107  Biased targeting and scoring 
technologies thus limit access to housing finance, which in turn 
narrows the scope of where minority individuals and families can 
search for housing.  Moreover, because biased algorithms 
disproportionately target minorities and low-income individuals, 
these already marginalized populations are forced to limit their 
housing searches to properties in communities that have homes of 
lesser value — communities, as it often turns out, already populated 
by minorities and other low-income families.108  These communities 
are continually neglected, leading to a lack of wealth and investment, 
which results in living conditions that are inadequate and unstable.  
Consequently, persons of means — composed primarily of non-
minorities — avoid searching for housing in these areas, further 
exacerbating preexisting segregation.109 
3. Discriminatory Algorithms in Housing Advertisements and 
Marketing 
The previous section detailed a basic agenda for researching 
algorithmic redlining in the context of access to housing finance.  This 
section discusses another form of algorithmic redlining, home 
searching algorithms, and details the importance of why further 
research and scrutiny is also needed in this area.  The online housing-
search process for communities and individuals of color is another 
potential cause of perpetuating segregation.110 
As University of Chicago Law Professor Lee Anne Fennell 
explains in her 2017 article, Searching for Housing, some online 
home-seeker biases may come from user-generated preferences, 
causing what is popularly known as de facto segregation.111  For 
example, many online housing marketers allow users to establish their 
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own search characteristics and, therefore, biases can be attributed to 
the preferences of the searchers rather than the algorithms.112  
However, as Fennell suggests, some biases may be built into third-
party algorithms in assumptions coded directly into search engine or 
home marketing website algorithms.113  This hypothesis regarding 
biased search results is increasingly troubling as more people utilize 
the internet to search for housing.114  As more and more home 
seekers turn to online portals to find where to live, it is important to 
understand that internet marketers and search engine operators use 
algorithms to provide users with a more personalized experience115 by 
cataloging user search histories, conducting geographical filtering, and 
using “bots” that “scrape” webpages to compile user information.116 
By incorporating an internet user’s “scraped” information and 
utilizing other aggregated data, algorithms can generate personalized 
advertising based on a user’s “latent trait inferences.”117  Latent trait 
inferences are assumptions about users that algorithms generate by 
analyzing their digital footprint.118  Online advertising platforms use 
latent trait inferences to target consumers and promote products they 
believe will lead to consumption.119  In theory, the attempt by online 
marketers and search engine providers to create more personalized 
ads based on latent trait inferences is merely an extension of 
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traditional marketing practices, which attempted to do the same with 
larger demographics.120  But in practice, as the algorithms that inform 
the process of personalization become more sophisticated, advertisers 
are able to target consumers more and more precisely, leading to 
predatory and discriminatory marketing practices.121 
When internet marketers and search engine providers deploy 
algorithms that capture and analyze user data, and then generate 
decisions based on that data, they serve as functional “gatekeepers” 
and “editors.”  As gatekeepers, advertising and search engine 
algorithms determine what information is displayed to any particular 
consumer.122  As editors, they determine how information already 
displayed is prioritized.123  In the housing arena, online marketing and 
search platforms potentially create algorithmic redlining if they are 
serving as biased gatekeepers or editors.  For example, as discussed 
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further below, by using “big data” and making accurate latent trait 
inferences about users, platforms can accurately identify users 
through race-correlative data points like zip code, name, profile 
picture, or various other data points in a user’s digital footprint.124   
When internet home marketing and search engines use these 
segregating scoring systems to stereotype and make assumptions 
about consumers, they nudge seekers of color towards houses 
available in communities and neighborhoods predominantly 
comprised of minorities, while simultaneously nudging white home 
seekers toward options in predominantly white and wealthy 
communities, thereby perpetuating preexisting segregation.125 
To be sure, this is only one of many potential harms in online home 
marketing that could result from automated decision-making, and 
should be studied further.126  Currently, there is little data on how 
websites like Trulia, Craigslist, or Facebook prioritize their millions of 
listings, because these massive databases have utilized intellectual 
property laws to incorporate a veil of secrecy in an effort to protect 
their code.127  In 2018, however, a lawsuit was filed against social-
media juggernaut Facebook, alleging that the abovementioned 
discriminatory marketing practices occurred on its website.128  Fair-
housing advocates brought the challenge, stating that Facebook had 
been “encourage[ing] its paid advertisers to discriminate using its vast 
trove of personal data.”129  Though alarming, the litigation filed 
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against Facebook’s alleged marketing practices should come as no 
surprise.  While research on how algorithms impact the marketing of 
housing is scant, there is abundant data showing that other areas of 
online advertising –– while not specifically incorporating race –– have 
incorporated race-compatible data points that produce race-oriented 
results.130  The use of race-compatible data points in online 
algorithms has drawn the ire of scholars and policymakers alike, who 
have reported that algorithms can come to biased conclusions that 
assume a person’s race based on factors like name, geographical 
region, record of consumer purchases, public records, and myriad 
other sources.131  These scholars and policymakers argue that by 
allowing advertisers to use race-compatible data points, we also allow 
them to harmfully stereotype consumers.132 
One stark example of this is found in a 2012 study commissioned 
by the Obama administration, which was tasked with assessing the 
impact and use of big data in targeted online advertisements.133  The 
study showed that search-engine inquiries for typically African-
American names lead to “negative” advertisements, such as those 
that contained the word “arrest.”134  Accordingly, a hypothetical 
person named Jerome who lives in a high-crime neighborhood, buys a 
pack of cigarettes a week, and has had a prior eviction, may be 
directed to options that would be considered “negative.”135  By 
contrast, typically Caucasian-American names lead to “neutral” 
advertisements.136  Anecdotes from other recent experiments 
concerning automated decisions indicate similarly biased results.137  
One study showed that artificial intelligence algorithms 
overwhelmingly responded to queries with the term, “beauty,” by 
producing results that leaned toward favoring white (or at least 
lighter) skin tones.138 
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Consequently, it seems that winning the uphill battle of fair and 
sufficient housing finance may be, to this day, a Sisyphean chore, as 
people of color may still be subjected to internet search and 
marketing algorithms that discriminatorily segregate communities 
based on race.  By acting as biased gatekeepers and editors, and by 
considering biased and discriminatory data points in their algorithms, 
online lending and housing search platforms are potentially 
prioritizing user-specific advertising at the expense of equitable 
marketing.  Such algorithmic redlining is harmful to the welfare of 
consumers from minority communities and only serves to reinforce 
cascading segregation.139 
B. When You Can’t Buy, Rent: Affordable Housing and Rental 
Housing Selection Algorithms 
Unfortunately, as a result of the many impediments discussed 
above, low-income, predominantly minority individuals living in 
communities of color, are often unable to purchase housing.140  Once 
purchasing is not a viable option, seekers-of-color are left to fend for 
themselves in competitive and pricey rental housing markets.141  
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While rental and subsidized markets do not provide the same equity 
value and cost-benefits of homeownership, these options are still 
important to overall quality of life.142  Fortunately, affordable housing 
development has been on the rise, and creative policies to expand 
affordable housing have recently been advanced.143  But even if a 
seeker-of-color resigns herself to renting rather than purchasing, a 
hurdle remains: algorithms that determine rental tenancy can fall prey 
to the same biases as algorithms in the housing purchase realm, 
thereby exacerbating and furthering the harms of algorithmic 
redlining. 
Affordable housing plays a pivotal role in the public’s overall well-
being,144 but, because of the its low cost, access to affordable housing 
is extremely competitive.145  Undoubtedly, algorithms are a powerful 
tool to assign affordable rental housing as efficiently as possible.146  
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https://ny.curbed.com/2017/6/8/15761716/essex-crossing-affordable-housing-
applications [https://perma.cc/R5XH-3U57] (demonstrating the disproportionality of 
the solution to the problem: over 93,000 applicants for only 104 available affordable 
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As beneficial as some these algorithms may be,147 some have 
nonetheless been the subject of scrutiny from both legal observers 
and housing advocates.148  As examined below, fair housing advocates 
and watchdog groups have asserted that the algorithms used in 
affordable housing lotteries rely on improper, biased preferences.149  
Further, algorithms are playing an increasingly important role in 
deciding who qualifies for private-market rental units, often tilting the 
playing field against individuals from low-income, minority 
neighborhoods.150 
1.  Improper Preferences in Affordable Housing Algorithms 
Recognizing the importance of housing affordability, federal, state, 
and local governments have enacted legislation encouraging and, at 
times, requiring available affordable housing — that is, housing 
provided below market rate and available on an income-driven 
basis.151  These heavier government requirements, coupled with rising 
market demand for affordable housing, have prompted housing 
authorities, as well as the landlords and developers they work with, to 
assess how to most efficiently administer and disburse affordable 
housing units to tenants.152  As already mentioned, algorithms are a 
powerful tool to enhance efficiency, and so have unsurprisingly 
become heavily intertwined in the administration of affordable 
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housing.153  While enhancing the efficient production and distribution 
of affordable housing, many of these algorithms have also been 
labelled discriminatory. 
In New York City, for example, Mayor Bill de Blasio’s 
administration introduced — and the city council passed — policies 
requiring that approximately twenty percent of all new housing 
development be reserved as “affordable housing.”154  To be 
recognized as “affordable,” units must satisfy two conditions: first, 
they have to be rented at a rate below market value, typically thirty 
percent less than other comparable units in the same building; second, 
they must be available only to applicants that earn a certain 
percentage below the building’s area median income.155  With this 
approach in place, individuals and families are able to apply to an 
“affordable housing lottery” that randomly selects applicants pending 
a screening process to assess whether they qualify for one of the 
affordable housing units.156  Though designating a block of units for 
low-income individuals and families may help integrate 
neighborhoods, these efforts are often insufficient, particularly when 
the algorithms used to generate such decisions remain faulty.157 
For instance, while New York’s approach is lauded as progressive, 
the algorithm used to select lottery applicants for screening also 
allegedly has a built-in bias: a preference for members of the 
surrounding community.158  Advocates and lawmakers have 
challenged this preferential treatment and argue that it gives an unfair 
advantage to individuals that already live in the area.159  These critics 
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often suggest that the preference policy keeps neighborhoods 
demographically homogeneous.160  Even though affordable housing 
algorithms are the product of government policy, they face the same 
challenges that corporate algorithms must contend with — they are 
obtuse, overly relied upon, and built using questionable data.161 
The obtuseness of government affordable housing algorithms is 
similar to the veil of secrecy surrounding the aforementioned internet 
marketing websites.162  Some municipalities disclose the details of 
their affordable housing lottery preferences, but for most of the tens 
of thousands of applicants jockeying for a few hundred units, the 
lottery and selection process remain a mystery.163  Moreover, city and 
state governments are turning to algorithms to make choices 
concerning affordable housing and, with increasing frequency, 
algorithmic decisions are having the last word.164  Of course, 
algorithms can be shortcuts to efficiently administering remedial 
decisions and approving a balanced pool of applicants, but reliance on 
these automated decisions without the prudence of human intuition 
may be costly and exacerbate segregation. 
Even if the veil of secrecy was lifted and the details of algorithms 
were known, applicants and fair housing advocates have raised 
concerns that some factors introduced by municipalities or affordable 
unit landlords are biased and antithetical to integration.165  Consider 
the 2010 dispute between the Department of Justice and the wealthy 
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Connecticut township of Darien, an idyllic town about midway 
between New York City and New Haven, Connecticut, with high-
performing public schools and an overall high quality of life.166  In 
2010, Darien’s population was 94 percent white,167 and when a 
developer purchased a plot of land with the goal of providing 
affordable housing, Darien’s affordable housing algorithmic weighing 
system came under scrutiny.168  Darien’s municipal algorithm 
distributed affordable housing based on a “priority population” 
preference system, which provided that available affordable units 
“shall be offered for sale or rent to income eligible households in 
accordance with [a set of seven] priority designations.”169  The first six 
priority categories gave preference to Darien residents or former 
Darien residents, with the lowest priority category explicitly 
relegating “[a]ll other individuals or families” to an afterthought.170  
Darien’s process would obviously work to the disadvantage of 
housing applicants from nearby Norwalk or Bridgeport, Connecticut 
towns with substantial minority populations and far less 
opportunity.171  Indeed, Darien’s suspect procedure was going to be 
investigated by the Department of Justice,172 and, fortunately, Darien 
withdrew its policy after the Department of Justice intervened.173  
Unfortunately, however, such preference systems still exist elsewhere, 
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in urban areas such as New York City and in affluent suburbs like 
Cheshire, Connecticut.174 
2. Rental Housing Algorithms 
Issues similar to those of publicly administered affordable housing 
algorithms have been raised about tenancy selection application 
algorithms utilized by the private rental sector.175  Under the FHA, 
landlords with rental units on the private market must adhere to a 
federal standard of nondiscrimination — they cannot refuse to rent a 
unit for reasons that rely on protected-class characteristics such as 
race.176  Though the algorithms that evaluate modern rental 
applications do not explicitly incorporate race, they often take 
account of a massive amount of statistics (through big data) that 
closely correlate with race, such as credit score, eviction records, 
arrest records, levels of education, employment backgrounds, and 
previous addresses.177  In another example of the “scored society,” 
because rental markets are so closely competitive, landlords often 
employ “tenant-screening firms” to “score” rental applicants and 
determine the applicant’s likely performance as a tenant.178  
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Unfortunately, like the scoring systems in housing finance, these 
scores are sometimes generated using biased or bad data.179 
As was the case with increasing transparency in housing finance to 
provide more equitable lending opportunities for borrowers-of-color, 
increasing transparency in renting will make a significant impact.  
Transparency in decisions regarding who has access to rental housing, 
who sees marketed units for rent, and who gets selected for those 
units is crucial to a fair rental housing process that promotes 
community integration.  It is evident that without appropriate reform 
people of color will continue to bear much of the brunt of biased data 
and discriminatory algorithms.  So what are some of the solutions to 
correct bad data and corrupt automated decisions?  This next Part 
explores prior reforms to the era of pencil redlining and potential 
reforms needed to bring those policies into the modern age. 
III.  POLICIES AND SOLUTIONS: LOOKING BACK AND LOOKING 
AHEAD 
During the previous era of pencil redlining, many progressive 
policies such as the FHA, the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), 
and the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) were passed in reaction 
to the improprieties and inequalities in access to fair and adequate 
housing.  The FHA introduced prohibitions against housing 
discrimination on the basis of enumerated protected categories, 
including race, color, and national origin, and established strict 
guidelines for the fair marketing of affordable housing to a range of 
potential applicants.180  The CRA was enacted in direct response to 
pencil redlining, establishing lending test policies that required banks 
to adhere to disclosure requirements, which federal regulators could 
then use to determine whether banks were fulfilling the needs of low-
income areas and individuals.181  Similarly, the FCRA was introduced 
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to ensure banks and credit reporting bureaus were not using incorrect 
or biased information in creditworthiness evaluations.182 
Though well-intended, because of misapplication and modern 
technological advancements, these policies are no longer able to 
protect the public from the current era of algorithmic redlining.  
Take, for example, the CRA’s lending test requirements, which allow 
the government to monitor how banks are lending to individuals 
specifically in low-income areas where the banks operate a brick-and-
mortar branch.183  This may have been effective as a direct response 
to pencil redlining.184  But today, as more banks move lending 
practices online and close brick-and-mortar branches, and as more 
and more modern financial technology institutions operate strictly 
online, it is far harder to monitor whether banks are providing 
investment and loan opportunities to the communities they are 
encouraged to serve.185  Similarly, as suggested by the plaintiffs in the 
litigation against Facebook, modern algorithms, though not 
specifically incorporating race, may be using race-correlative data to 
skirt the FHA’s provisions that prohibit landlords from 
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discriminatory marketing and from rejecting housing applicants based 
on their belonging to a suspect class.186 
With an eye toward modernization, the final Part of this Article 
suggests reforms to these policies and others — upgrades to the web 
of intersecting guidelines that impact fair housing so they seamlessly 
interact with policies that promote transparency and auditing.  Some 
of these upgrades demand human oversight over automated decisions 
— because without this oversight, current automated decision systems 
will continue their patterns of algorithmic redlining.  Some of the 
reforms proposed here are presently considered more out-of-the-box, 
but, as argued herein, are critical to promote community integration 
and desegregation in a modern society. 
Broadly speaking, many scholars who have studied how to prevent 
algorithms from furthering discrimination and producing disparate 
impacts have called for more accountability in algorithms that 
generate automated decisions, specifically by increasing transparency, 
auditing or oversight, and involving human autonomy.187  Without 
transparency, those impacted by algorithmic redlining in housing 
finance, home marketing, and tenancy selection will remain unaware 
of how enigmatic algorithms and big data reduce their opportunities 
for fair and affordable housing or how they worsen community 
segregation.188  Without auditing, biased data inputs and disparate 
outcomes may continue to perpetuate race-based results, like nudging 
minority home seekers towards housing in minority areas while 
pushing non-minority home seekers to more affluent areas.189  
Finally, without human oversight and autonomous decision-making in 
fair and affordable housing, gatekeepers such as management 
companies and lenders may continue to rely on algorithms that are 
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perilous to minorities and advantageous for non-minorities.190  In the 
following section, each of these arguments — transparency, auditing, 
and autonomy — is analyzed to assess how future policies ought to 
combat this new era of algorithmic redlining. 
A. Transparency: Promoting Choice and Accountability Through an 
Understanding of Automated Decisions 
Automated decisions that impact housing procurement should 
become more transparent.  In reaction to the previous era of pencil 
redlining, many fair housing advocates combatted segregation 
through legislative advocacy, pushing for laws such as the ECOA and 
the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) — both of which 
required banks to disclose certain scoring and rating techniques they 
use in credit evaluations.191  Also, as previously mentioned, the CRA 
was passed in response to redlining and required banks to report their 
efforts of lending in low- and moderate-income communities to 
federal regulators.192  To make these laws relevant to modern 
technologies, they must be updated to incorporate similar disclosure 
and lending requirements for new types of internet financial outlets 
and online lending institutions.  Further, the laws must be amended to 
establish greater disclosure requirements for banks and online 
marketers that rely on automated decision systems. 
Consider the CRA, which presently does not apply to increasingly 
popular internet banking institutions and popular financial 
technology outlets.  CRA Section 2901 requires federally insured 
banks to demonstrate that they “serve the convenience and needs of 
the communities in which they are chartered to do business,” and 
demands that they evidence a “continuing and affirmative obligation 
to help meet the credit needs of the local communities in which they 
are chartered,” consistent with their safe and sound operation.193  
Also relevant is Section 2903 of the CRA, which provides that the 
bank’s designated regulatory agency shall “assess the [community 
banking] institution’s record of meeting the credit needs of its entire 
community, including low- and moderate-income 
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neighborhoods . . . .”194  Undoubtedly, these provisions were a step in 
the right direction towards combatting the ills of the pencil redlining 
era.  However, the CRA should be updated so that it applies beyond 
banks and the “local communities in which they are chartered.”  
Rather, amendments to the act should focus on applying to all (or at 
least to a large share) of online lending institutions, and should not be 
tied to brick-and-mortar branches.  Consider, also, the provisions of 
the ECOA that require mortgage lenders to collect information for 
“monitoring” when accepting mortgage applications for home 
financing.195  It should be evident that ethnicity ought not be a 
requirement (or, at the very least, should be a permissive category), 
but the Act should also be amended to include a provision that 
requires lenders to disclose the exact metrics or data points they use 
to generate scores or determine borrower interest rates. 
Aside from revising antiquated language in laws to make them 
current, transparency can be facilitated by requiring disclosure from 
public agencies that utilize privately-owned algorithmic decision-
making systems.  When contracting and partnering with businesses, 
federal, state, and local governments should be required to disclose 
the background information, such as the various data sources, of the 
algorithms they use.  For example, legal advocates from the Brennan 
Center at New York University School of Law recently sued the New 
York Police Department (NYPD) after it refused to comply with the 
Center’s Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) request, asking for and 
receiving some NYPD documents about its predictive policing 
algorithms.196  Rather than requiring lawsuits and FOIL requests to 
invoke transparency, governments at all levels should use their 
contracting power to require disclosure, making transparency the rule 
rather than the exception.  A bill introduced by the New York City 
Council is a model for legislation that is a step in this direction.  The 
bill, though not requiring public disclosure, would create a 
governmental “task force” to review algorithms being used by public 
entities and actors.197 
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Aside from the above proposed legislative amendments and 
contractual changes, lawmakers should require advanced disclosure 
from the credit bureaus that generate credit scores or from the 
lenders that make decisions using these algorithms — this is a change 
that would directly address the aforementioned hurdles in the housing 
arena.  Further, governments should require disclosure from the 
online marketers that act as gatekeepers and editors in disseminating 
home marketing information, otherwise seekers would not be able to 
determine whether they are viewing truly unbiased results.  Finally, 
when algorithms operate to screen affordable and rental tenancy 
applicants, those administering the algorithms should clearly and 
expressly inform lottery entrants and rental applicants about the 
process by, for example, disclosing what factors are weighed and 
naming any third-party screening consultancies that are involved. 
Lawmakers have a responsibility to ensure that seekers, 
particularly those from minority neighborhoods, have the ability to 
assess whether scores are biased, search characteristics are skewed, or 
factors are perpetuating segregation by limiting access for people of 
color to move into non-minority neighborhoods.  A powerful way to 
do this is by increasing public transparency, empowering seekers and 
renters by giving them more knowledge of the details of otherwise 
opaque algorithms that make potentially life-changing decisions for 
them.  However, disclosure alone is not enough; to ensure a level 
playing field, lawmakers must also audit the information algorithms 
are being fed and the outcomes they generate. 
B. Auditing Algorithms for Fairness 
In addition to disclosure, legislation should focus on auditing 
algorithmic inputs and outputs.  Inputs are the troves of data that 
artificial intelligence algorithms learn from to arrive at outputs, the 
actual autonomous decisions and scores that algorithms generate.198  
Algorithmic auditing is increasingly important as algorithms become 
more complex and autonomous.199  Transparency will go a long way 
in requiring disclosure for identifiable source code information in an 
algorithm, like what preferences are already built into an affordable 
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housing lottery’s policy.  However, as recently explained in an article 
by a group of leading internet scholars, transparency alone is 
necessary but not sufficient: 
Machine learning, one increasingly popular approach to automated 
decisionmaking, is particularly ill-suited to source code analysis [i.e., 
through transparency] because it involves situations where the 
decisional rule itself emerges automatically from the specific data 
under analysis, sometimes in ways that no human can explain.  In 
this case, source code alone teaches a reviewer very little, since the 
code only exposes the machine learning method used and not the 
data-driven decision rule.200 
In other words, the code in machine learning algorithms is not 
necessarily where biases generate, rather, they come from the data 
with which the algorithm is “taught.”  Accordingly, regulators 
advocating for transparency would struggle to understand disclosures 
made for complex machine learning algorithms, because they crunch 
gargantuan amounts of data, learn from it, and then make 
autonomous decisions.201  For such algorithms, it is important to 
monitor the types of data inputs they use, and then correct any biased 
information they are being fed.202  In that regard, where algorithms 
operate to influence key public welfare decisions, such as those in 
affordable housing, operators should be required to disclose what 
data sets they used to “train” the artificial intelligence algorithm.  
Simultaneously, the outputs produced by these algorithms should be 
audited to assess whether there is a constant bias that repeats time 
and again, and whether they produce results otherwise adverse to the 
public interest.203 
As applied to the aforementioned areas of algorithmic redlining, 
credit card companies, credit reporting bureaus, and mortgage 
lenders should be required to disclose the data inputs they use to 
formulate credit scores and mortgage rates.  Simultaneously, those 
entities ought to be audited to determine whether the scores and rates 
they are producing are disproportionately higher for lenders-of-color, 
or whether they produce other disparate impacts on marginalized 
populations.  Internet marketers, search engine operators, affordable 
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housing lottery administrators, and landlords that utilize algorithms 
should be similarly audited to ensure they rely on non-discriminatory 
data for their inputs, and that they correct any outputs that produce 
adverse results for disenfranchised groups. 
C. Human Oversight and Autonomy: Algorithms as a Method of 
Retaining Free Will 
Increased transparency and oversight are especially necessary in 
decisions regarding fundamental needs as crucial as housing.  But 
such a basic right also demands human autonomy, so that we can 
ensure affordable units are fairly administered.204  As expressed 
previously, housing is an element of American life that closely binds 
individuals to what society has frequently considered of utmost 
importance: education, health, job opportunity, economic prosperity, 
community development, and community integration.205  Thus, while 
both transparency and auditing are required to break down the 
barriers that currently prohibit access to housing, neither will solve 
the problems of algorithmic hubris, particularly because of 
automation bias — the human tendency to believe without question 
algorithmic results.206  To tamper our overreliance of algorithms, 
automated decision making must be coupled with an accountable 
level of human autonomy.  Take, for example, a 2016 exchange 
between Tom Woods, the Chairman of the National Association of 
Home Builders, and then U.S. Senator Heidi Heitkamp, which took 
place at a Congressional hearing concerning access to mortgage 
credit.207  Senator Heitkamp asked Mr. Woods directly about the 
“trend to try and analyze creditworthiness looking at big data and 
algorithms and different kinds of inputs.”208  Implying that such a 
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trend may lead to the overreliance of algorithmically generated scores 
and decisions, Senator Heitkamp wanted to know if this was a present 
problem or “a 10-year-out problem.”209  Mr. Woods responded 
indicating that it was likely a “10-year-out problem,” but that he was 
“intrigued” by that kind of data.210  He also indicated that, at least in 
the early stages of this “trend,” such scoring did limit the autonomy of 
the community banker, steering them away from making an intuitive 
decision: 
You could have a banker, a client or customer comes in and you 
look at the financial statement.  It checks all the boxes.  There is no 
way you are going to give them a loan.  The guy who owns the body 
shop down the street who you know has always paid his bills, 
because you know his community reputation, you want to give him 
the loan and you do not want to be dinged for it in an examination, 
or you want to be able to do what you have always done in your 
communities.211 
Mr. Woods’s description of the “guy who owns a body shop” 
epitomizes the risk of the community banker strictly adhering to 
algorithmic scoring and decisions.  A banker must be willing to 
consider the validity a loan that his or her intuition tells them might 
be valid, regardless of automaton.  This is especially vital when 
algorithms operate to perpetuate adverse lending practices by failing 
to serve individuals and families that have been discriminately scored 
and ruled uncreditworthy.  Accordingly, regulations in the housing 
arena should seek to implement a structure where decisions are 
ultimately made or reviewed by a human decision-maker who can 
think about justice, fairness, and equity.212 
Procedures should be put in place to allow community bankers and 
other lenders to approve loans that depart from algorithmic decisions 
if they feel that the algorithms failed to consider, or adversely 
considered, “intangibles” that ought to point towards approval.  The 
same should be applied to housing authorities and landlords that use 
algorithms for affordable housing lotteries and rental tenancy.  
Moreover, as discussed in detail in the following section, internet 
marketers and search engine operators should be held accountable 
for knowingly using algorithms that operate as biased gatekeepers 
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and editors, rather than being shielded from liability under the safe 
harbors of internet advertising legislation. 
D. Other Reforms and Modernizations 
As is often the case with reforms, implementing procedures that 
increase transparency, auditing, and human oversight will be an uphill 
battle.  For one, as noted by the exchange between Mr. Woods and 
Senator Heitkamp, many key stakeholders see these issues as a “10-
year-out problem,” leading them to sweep the issue under the rug or 
become more reactionary than proactive.213  Moreover, as briefly 
addressed above, disclosure requirements through transparency and 
auditing are difficult to demand from private actors that act in 
completely private spheres, as these entities are protected by 
intellectual property laws and other safe harbors.214  The opacity of 
automated decision-making in the private sector will remain a burden 
to the “scored society” as long as intellectual property law and bank 
regulations maintain favorable safe harbors, which protect the 
interests of powerful corporate entities at the expense of 
consumers.215  The following section identifies and expands upon 
reforms that several legal scholars have recently advocated for in 
areas like intellectual property, data protection, internet law, and 
public administration, which reflect the ways consumers operate in 
the modern economy. 
1. Improvements to Intellectual Property, Data Protection, and 
Internet Law 
In the area of intellectual property, trade secret laws protect many 
algorithms from disclosure, allowing private actors to veil automated 
decisions behind a wall of business interests.216  Banks, credit outlets, 
mortgage evaluators, online marketers, and tenant-screening firms 
can use trade secret protections to guard their valuable code.217  In 
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the future, such business interests should be weighed against notions 
of public welfare, and courts ought to come to more favorable 
decisions for plaintiffs bringing appeals against algorithmic decisions.  
Such reforms have been promoted by internet law scholars like 
Professor Frank Pasquale, author of The Black Box Society as well as 
a number of other articles concerning internet law reform.  Professor 
Pasquale, along with other legal scholars, has suggested that internet 
juggernauts provide services so critical to the public that they ought to 
be viewed by courts and the public as utility companies, which are 
typically subject to transparency requirements and reviews of 
decision-making procedures.218 
Additionally, as evidenced by legislation introduced abroad, 
transparency of algorithmic decisions can be accomplished through 
legislation meant to police automated decisions.219  In that regard, the 
United States should consider introducing legislation similar to the 
European Union’s comprehensive General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR).  The GDPR took effect in 2018, replacing the 
European Data Protection Directive (EDPD) that, in essence, 
regulated the processing of personal data and brokerage of such 
data.220  The E.U. enacted the GDPR to cope with the slew of issues 
that arise from rapid technological advancements, including data 
privacy, algorithmic decision-making, and antitrust problems.221 
While the GDPR focuses heavily on data privacy and protection, a 
key provision of the regulation, Article 22, specifically addresses 
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decisions based solely on automated decisions systems.222  Article 22, 
titled “Automated individual decision-making, including profiling,” 
explicitly limits the reliance of auto-generated decisions involving an 
individual’s legal rights.223  Additionally, Article 22 allows individuals 
a right to intervene and dispute algorithmically generated decisions 
they feel adversely impact them.224  To make sure that entities 
making algorithmically generated decisions are held accountable, the 
GDPR also introduced provisions implementing fines for non-
compliance, adding teeth to the oversight mechanisms put in place.225 
The United States should follow in the European Union’s footsteps 
by pursuing a policy similar to that enacted in Article 22.  This policy 
should not limit oversight to algorithmically generated decisions 
pertaining to legal rights, but should also expand oversight to those 
decisions that concern fundamental moral rights such as those that 
impact housing.  This type of oversight would place the ultimate 
autonomy back into the hands of the community banker, which will 
level the playing field in online marketing and promote rational, 
empathetic, human decision-making regarding housing finance and 
rental options, even if it goes against outcomes calculated by 
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algorithms.226  Undoubtedly, humans are also biased and imperfect, 
but without any responsibility from a human actor, overreliance on 
machine algorithms will leave housing decision-makers asleep at the 
wheel, with limited recourse for housing advocates and seekers. 
2. Adjustments to Internet Law 
In addition to adopting provisions similar to Article 22 of the 
GDPR, the United States should emulate the E.U.’s general 
philosophy and begin to consider a more comprehensive overhaul of 
its antiquated regulations.  Currently, a web of legislation impacts 
how modern algorithmic decisions are regulated, but many of the 
component pieces of legislation have been rendered ineffective by 
technological advancements, or may even be antithetical to one 
another.227 
One example of how the laws are now antiquated and ineffective is 
illustrated by a principle provision of the FHA — the prohibition 
against marketing housing on the basis of an enumerated protected 
category, like race, color, or national origin.228  Although this 
provision is still in place, it can be easily skirted by algorithms that 
make accurate latent trait inferences after analyzing data that is race-
correlative but not per se inclusive of race, color, or national origin.229  
This seems like a paradoxical approach: advertisements for housing 
that discriminate based on a protected class, such as race, are not 
legal, but advertisements for housing that use assumptions based on a 
digital footprint that imply race (but exclude its direct incorporation) 
seem entirely lawful. 
That the laws governing algorithmic decision-making can 
sometimes act in opposition to one another is a serious problem.  For 
example, when advertisements that rely on implied race are 
generated by computer-automated decisions and not curated by 
humans, many of the marketers dispersing the ads are shielded from 
liability — precisely because of various safe harbor provisions in 
 
 226. Christina M. Mulligan, Perfect Enforcement of Law: When to Limit and 
When to Use Technology, 14 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 2–3 (2007) (providing a 
framework that can be used to determine the wisdom of using a technology to 
enforce law by explaining the several types of perfect enforcement and analyzing the 
concerns raised by their use). 
 227. Christina Mulligan, Technology Intermediaries and Freedom of Press, 66 
S.M.U. L. REV. 157, 169–70 (2013). 
 228. Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2012). 
 229. See discussion supra Section II.B.2. 
266 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLVI 
other parts of piecemeal legislation.230  Specifically, safe harbor 
provisions in the Digital Millennium Copy Right Act (DMCA) and 
the Communications Decency Act (CDA) shield internet service 
providers, online marketers, and search engine platforms from 
liability for any content algorithmically generated on their 
platforms.231  Thus, online marketers and search engine platforms like 
Facebook and Google are not liable for advertisements and other 
gatekeeper decisions generated by algorithms.232 
Some internet advocates and users argue that these kinds of 
legislative shields are foundational to facilitating internet free 
speech.233  This may certainly be true, and this work does not discount 
the importance of free speech protections — but considering the 
current state of affairs and the increasingly monopolistic tendencies of 
internet firms, it seems the pendulum may have swung too far.  
Internet-based corporations are so massive, inherently powerful, and 
enjoy such significant protections from liability that Professor 
Pasquale has called them “functional sovereigns” but “absentee 
owners.”234  Pasquale uses the term “functional sovereign” as a way 
of describing “the level of power a private firm reaches when it is no 
longer one of many market participants, but instead the main 
supervisor and organizer of actual market participants.”235  At the 
same time, these massive firms operate as “absentee owners,” 
“neglect[ing] traditional functions [firms] had previously served, in 
order to maximize revenue in accordance with its . . . demands.”236 
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Consider an example of this kind of contradiction — the safe 
harbor provisions in the DMCA and CDA mean that if an 
advertisement reflecting discriminatory housing marketing was 
displayed in a print publication such as the Wall Street Journal or the 
New York Times, the Journal or the Times would be liable for the 
dissemination of the ad.237  By contrast, if Facebook’s algorithms 
were to display the same discriminatory advertisement on its 
platform, Facebook would be immune from any liability as long as the 
advertisement was a product of its algorithmic marketing system.238 
3. Modernizing Public Administration 
Appreciating the necessity for transparency, auditing, and human 
oversight, as well as the need for comprehensive reform, some 
scholars have suggested that a central government agency with 
expertise in the area could be created to oversee and apply these 
principles.  In 2008, for example, Professors Oren Bracha and Frank 
Pasquale suggested the need for a “Federal Search Commission,” 
which would supervise search engine manipulation and algorithmic 
discrimination.239  In 2016, Professors Paul Ohm and Blake Reid 
introduced a similar centralized authority concept.240  Certainly, this 
kind of centralized agency is needed, but it can go beyond 
supervision.  This agency should not only make search engine 
algorithms and methods more transparent and accountable, but also 
expand its reach into other areas of the internet, such as policing big 
data brokers and private actors that rely on automated decisions to 
make choices crucial to the public interest.241  This agency should also 
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borrow successful components from other agencies, such as the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), an agency that works 
with other government actors like the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) to police and prosecute 
industry practices harmful to American consumers.242  The new 
internet oversight agency should also use expertise from industry and 
academic leaders to think of new, creative reforms to create an 
internet accountable to consumers.243 
Further, this centralized internet agency could work with other 
governmental actors to specifically combat algorithmic redlining.  For 
example, the agency could work with the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD), as well as state and local housing 
agencies, to ensure that algorithms in affordable housing lotteries and 
rental tenancy applications are being administered fairly.  Similarly, 
the centralized agency could work with banking regulators like the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Commission (FDIC) and Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) to spearhead reforms for “algorithmic 
compliance,” so that the algorithms used in credit ratings and lending 
evaluations satisfy the protections of the CRA.244 
4. Changes by Private Actors 
Governmental action in the form of legislation, oversight or a 
specific legislative agency, will not be enough to tackle the myriad 
problems with algorithmic accountability.  This is particularly so 
considering how rapidly technology changes, how slowly government 
operates, and the fact that the Federal Government has recently 
rolled back progressive reforms.  Ultimately, some changes have to be 
made in the private sector.  Indeed, private actors have begun to 
initiate reforms to combat algorithmic discrimination and should do 
more to police algorithmic redlining.  For example, when addressing 
European Union policymakers in 2018, Tim Cook, CEO of 
technology juggernaut Apple, discussed the “weaponization” of 
personal data and the need for reform.245  Cook’s sentiment directly 
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aligned with reforms internet law scholars have advocated for, 
particularly their suggestions of creating “information fiduciaries.”246  
Similar to doctors, lawyers, or financial advisors, information 
fiduciaries would have a primary duty of care to individuals whose 
data they are collecting and brokering.247 
In addition to information fiduciaries, there are reforms that 
private actors should introduce specifically to combat algorithmic 
redlining and improve algorithmic equity in the housing arena.  For 
example, some scholars have highlighted the benefits of encouraging 
an era of “greenlining.”  As described by law professor Mary Stzo, 
greenlining “directs investment into communities to encourage 
individual behaviors that will maximize net social benefits directly 
within the constraints of available resources [with a] main goal [of] 
neutralizing disinvestment with investment.”248  Other instances of 
private actors taking proactive steps to combat segregation can be 
seen from modern lending institutions like SoFi.249  After pressure 
from regulators, SoFi, a strictly online financial institution, adopted a 
policy to adhere to the reporting components of the CRA and thus 
has a much stronger incentive to serve low- and moderate-income 
communities.250 
CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, no single approach will be a silver bullet, and many 
reforms are needed in both private and public practice to remedy the 
harmful results of algorithmic redlining.  The solutions suggested 
above, tough as the may be to pursue, are critical to protect home 
seekers from discriminatory algorithms and to advance community 
integration. 
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The harms of the original era of redlining have had a profound, 
often unendurable adverse impact on communities and individuals of 
color.  As public and private actors begin to rely more heavily on 
automated decisions, society is at risk of perpetuating the deleterious 
impacts of pencil redlining through algorithms in housing finance, 
marketing, and tenancy selection.  This Article suggested three 
discrete areas where algorithmic redlining may further segregation.  
First, in housing finance, where decision-makers rely on algorithms 
that generate biased credit scores and predatory marketing targets.  
Second, in online home marketing and housing searches, where 
operators may nudge seekers toward homogenous, self-integrating 
housing options, as they seem to be doing in other areas of online 
marketing and internet searching.  Finally, in housing selection, where 
authorities that determine tenancy for affordable housing and rental 
units are using biased calculations and selection characteristics to 
inform their tenancy selections.  Even a cursory inspection of these 
three areas shows that further transparency, auditing, and human 
oversight over algorithmic redlining are absolutely necessary.  
However, resolving the problems in these areas alone is not enough 
— to truly combat algorithmic discrimination more fundamental 
reforms are required.  Without sweeping, large-scale reforms in the 
modern housing procurement process, algorithmic redlining is likely 
to become more prevalent, only serving to exacerbate preexisting 
discrimination and segregation. 
 
